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Abstract
Social capital affects many social and economic outcomes; hence, it is impor-
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to describe the trends of 10 proxies of social capital in 30 Western and Eastern
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1 Introduction
Social capital, defined as “network together with shared norms, values and under-
standings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (OECD, 2001), affects
many real-life domains. The literature documented its relationship with health (Jetten
et al., 2010), economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik,
2005b), well-being (Powdthavee, 2010, Bartolini and Sarracino, 2014, Western et al.,
2005), and democracy (Putnam et al., 1993). However, the literature paid limited at-
tention to three important issues. First, the information about how various dimensions
of social capital evolved over time and across countries is limited. Second, the path-
dependency of trends of social capital has not been explored, i.e. it is not clear to what
extent the trends depend on the initial levels of social capital. Third, the convergence of
social capital among European regions remains under explored. This paper addresses
these issues analyzing trends of social capital in 30 European countries from 1990 to
2012.
The evolution of social capital over time, and in particular the possible erosion of
social capital in modern societies, is not a new topic in the literature (Polanyi, 1968,
Hirsch, 1976). However, the scarcity of long time series and cross-country comparable
data limited the analysis of the trends. This issue received a renewed attention after the
work by Robert Putnam showing that since the 1970s the American society experienced
a decline in several indicators of social capital (Putnam, 2000). This evidence raised the
awareness about the erosion of social capital and animated a lively debate (for a review,
see: Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The scarce availability of data from non US societies
limited the analyses to selected countries or only to a limited set of indicators (Arts
and Halman, 2004, Van Oorschot et al., 2006, Morales, 2004, Adam, 2008, Sarracino,
2010, Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2005a).
The first goal of this analysis is to describe the trends of social capital in Europe
overcoming many of the previous limitations. This analysis uses time-series not only
forWestern, but also for Eastern European countries: those which entered the European
Union as well as some of those that stayed outside. Moreover, this analysis employs
a wide set of indicators. Contrary to the majority of existing studies, the description
is not limited to changes of trust in others, membership in associations, and voluntary
work. In order to provide a more comprehensive picture, the paper analyzes also an
index of civic cooperation, which measures the perceived obligations of individuals
toward other people and the state. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of state
institutions for the creation and sustaining of social capital, the paper also analyzes
how confidence in institutions has changed over recent decades. Extending the analysis
to new regions and using a broad set of indicators allows us to draw a more complete
picture of how social capital has been changing over recent decades in Europe.
The second goal of this analysis is to explore the convergence of social capital
among European regions. In other words, the goal it to test whether the European
unification has an equalizing effect on social capital. This issue is particularly relevant
for the post-communist and Southern countries where the endowments of social capital
are generally lower than in North-Western countries (Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008).
The European integration with its institutions and common rules may have equalizing
effects on social capital, thus filling the gap among regions in Europe.
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Finally, the third goal of this paper is to investigate the path dependency of the
trends of social capital. Specifically this analysis investigates how the trends of various
dimensions of social capital are related to their initial levels. This amounts to test
whether the low level of social capital hinders its subsequent growth.
The time frame covers the period between the early 1990s up to the year 2012.1
This period corresponds to important changes taking place all over Europe. In many
countries of the broadly defined West, it was the period of gradual dismantling of the
welfare state, which might have affected various dimensions of social capital. In the
East, the same period was marked by political and economic transformation, where the
collapse of state economies was accompanied by drastic reduction of social security.
In the same period, however, countries of Eastern Europe experienced unprecedented
widening of individual and political freedoms. These changes might have affected the
trends of social capital in unpredictable ways.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous research on the
trends of social capital and on its regional variations. Section 3 describes the data
adopted for the research and the methodological approach. Section 4 describes the
results of the analysis looking at differences among trends by country (section 4.1), by
region (section 4.2) and by ranking (section 4.3). Section 4.4 describes the findings
concerning the convergence of social capital among European regions. Section 4.5
explores the hypothesis that the trends of social capital are path-dependent, whereas
section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
2.1 Trends of social capital
Putnam (2000) showed that the American society experienced a decline of several
dimensions of social capital: voting turnout; attending meetings, political rallies or
speeches; trust in the government; and membership and activity in voluntary organiza-
tions. These results supported the thesis that civil society is subject to erosion. Subse-
quent works confirmed Putnam’s findings to varying degrees. For instance, Bartolini
et al. (2013) reported negative trends of various dimensions of American social capital,
including: frequency of marriages and separations, social trust, frequency of socializ-
ing with neighbors, and confidence in a range of institutions. The work by Ebbinghaus
(2002) described a strongly negative trend of US membership in labour unions. Other
studies provided less support to the thesis of decline of social capital over time. An
analysis by Paxton (1999) about US reported some decline in a general measure of
social capital, in particular trust in individuals, but no general decline in trust in institu-
tions, and no decline in membership in associations. Similarly, Costa and Kahn (2001),
referring to the decline of social capital in the US between 1970s-1990s, concluded that
it has been largely overstated. Their results showed that the largest decline concerned
socializing daily with family, friends and neighbors, which they explain by rising com-
munities’ heterogeneity and income inequality, as well as the rise in women’s labor
1Data from the 1980s are not included because they cover exclusively Western countries.
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force participation. In a similar vein, Adam (2008), using World Values Survey data,
found no evidence of decreasing American social capital.
The analysis of European data contributed to a separate, even though less devel-
oped, stream of research. If the erosion of social capital is driven by social and demo-
graphic processes, there are reasons to expect similarities between the trends in Europe
and in the US. For instance, Costa and Kahn (2001) predicted that – due to immigration
and growing income inequalities – also Western European countries would experience
an erosion of social capital. The evidence about the decline of social capital in Europe
is mixed, and varies depending on which dimensions are considered.
Trust in others, one of the most common measures of social capital, shows some
signs of decline. Adam (2008) examined World Values Survey and European Values
Study data and found that in the 1980s, trust in others was generally growing in Europe,
whereas in the 1990s the negative trends outnumbered the positive ones. (The negative
trends occurred mainly in Eastern Europe; out of EU-15 six showed a negative trend,
five – positive, and two – stable.) An analysis by Dekker and Broek (2005) for 10
Western European countries, US, and Canada also failed to observe a consistent decline
of trust in others. A similar conclusion is supported by the works reviewed by Stolle
and Hooghe (2004) and by the results provided by Sarracino (2010, 2012). The latter
provided evidence that trust in others has been growing in several Western European
countries.
A more positive picture has been drawn for membership in voluntary organizations.
Adam (2008) reported a heterogeneous, but on average positive, trend of involvement
in associations in European countries. Both membership and unpaid voluntary work
have been decreasing in Europe in the 1980s, whereas for the 1990s the results are
more mixed: membership increased in 11, and unpaid work in 19 out of 30 countries.
Several other analyses concluded that neither positive nor negative trends prevail in
Europe (Morales, 2004, Dekker and Broek, 2005, Stolle and Hooghe, 2004), whereas
Sarracino (2010, 2012) pointed out a positive trend in several countries.
An overall negative picture has been drawn also for the trends of confidence in
institutions. Sarracino (2010, 2012) showed that since the 1980s the citizens ofWestern
European countries have lost confidence in the judicial system, religious institutions,
parliament, and civil service, although some countries stood out as notable exceptions.
2.2 Regional variation of social capital in Europe
Despite the progressing economic and political unification, Europe remains highly het-
erogeneous. Levels of social capital, as well as the trends, differ across countries and
regions (Van Oorschot et al., 2006).
Among European regions, Scandinavia is consistently described as the one which
stands out with high levels of social capital, including membership, trust in others, and
civic engagement (the Netherlands is typically also included in this group, see: Adam,
2008, Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania, 2004, Pichler and Wallace, 2007). Bartkowski
and Jasin´ska-Kania (2004) noticed that the already high membership and activity in
voluntary associations in Scandinavian countries have been growing also in the last
two decades of the twentieth century. Scandinavian social capital has also other pe-
culiarities: low levels of informal contacts with next-of-kin (lowest scores in Europe,
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see: Van Oorschot et al., 2006), and high proportion of “checkbook membership”, i.e.
extensive, but passive membership in associations, often limited to paying the member-
ship fees and not generating much opportunities for face-to-face contacts (Stromsnes
and Wollebæk, 2006).
Other Western European countries are typically characterized by relatively high
levels of social capital (Adam, 2008). Van Oorschot et al. (2006) described this re-
gion as scoring slightly lower than average on political engagement, and higher than
European average on trust in institutions. A specific country in this context is Great
Britain. Sarracino (2010) pointed out that it has the most negative trends of social cap-
ital in Europe: 14 out of the 15 analyzed proxies have been declining between 1980
and 2000.
Southern European countries (including typically Italy, Spain, Portugal, andGreece)
score relatively low on social capital, including trustworthiness, trust in institutions, ac-
tive participation and political engagement (Van Oorschot et al., 2006). Bartkowski and
Jasin´ska-Kania (2004) related the low levels of social activity in these countries with
lower socio-economic development, economic freedom, and civil liberties. The long
periods of autocratic rule in Spain, Portugal, and Greece might also contribute to ex-
plain the specificity of the region (Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania, 2004). The analysis
by Adam (2008) points out that social capital in Italy, France and Spain was compa-
rable with other Western countries, whereas in Greece and Portugal was much lower.
The social capital in Southern countries is not only low, but it also depends heavily on
informal networks (Pichler and Wallace, 2007).
In Eastern Europe social capital is typically lower than in Western Europe (Fidrmuc
and Gërxhani, 2008, Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2004). However, this general statement
must be taken cautiously, as the whole region is very heterogeneous. Adam (2008) no-
ticed that the levels of social capital were close to European average in Slovenia, Czech
Republic, and Slovakia, whereas they were much lower in Poland, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine. Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania
(2004) drew a similar picture: social involvement was relatively high, and growing in
Czech Republic and Slovakia; in contrast, in Poland and Hungary, the initially high
social involvement of the 1990s declined to the level of the countries belonging to the
former Soviet Union (Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania, 2004). In Baltic states member-
ship and activity were rather low, although higher than in other former Soviet Union
countries (Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania, 2004). Finally, Russia, Ukraine, and Be-
larus stood out not only with the lowest levels of economic freedom, civil liberties, and
socio-economic development, but also with the lowest levels of voluntary activity –
despite the relatively high indicators of formal membership in organizations (e.g. trade
unions or youth organizations). It is worth emphasizing that such organizations were
state-controlled bureaucratic institutions in the former Soviet Union. Also here the fall
of communism was followed by a dramatic decline in membership (membership over-
all in Russia fell from 70% in 1990 to 30% in 1999; membership in trade unions in
Russia and Ukraine fell from about 50% to slightly over 20% of the population, see:
Bartkowski and Jasin´ska-Kania, 2004).
Overall, the pattern of geographical variation seems to be related to the quality
of functioning of state institutions. Several authors have associated high social capi-
tal with economic development (Norris, 2001, Curtis et al., 2001, Fidrmuc and Gërx-
5
hani, 2004, Delhey and Newton, 2005, Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005), democratization
(Norris, 2001, Curtis et al., 2001, Stromsnes and Wollebæk, 2006), and the quality of
democratic infrastructure and institutions (Stromsnes and Wollebæk, 2006, Fidrmuc
and Gërxhani, 2004, Letki and Evans, 2005, Delhey and Newton, 2005). Indeed, ac-
cording to some authors social capital is a consequence rather than a precondition of
well-functioning institutions (Stromsnes and Wollebæk, 2006, Letki and Evans, 2005).
This suggests that the expansion of the European Union may be a chance for the rel-
atively backward Eastern and Southern regions to catch-up (Fidrmuc and Gërxhani,
2004).
2.3 Current study
The goal of this study is threefold. First, it describes the trends of social capital in 30
European countries, using a larger set of proxies of social capital, a longer time-span,
and a larger number of countries than previous studies. Second, it tests the hypothesis
that social capital among European countries converges, i.e. that Eastern and Southern
countries catch up with the levels of social capital of Northern and Western Europe.
Finally, the paper examines path-dependency of social capital in Europe. In particu-
lar, it tests the hypothesis that initial low levels of social capital may result in lower
subsequent growth.
3 Data and method
The World Values Survey and the European Values Study integrated data-set (WVS,
2009, EVS, 2011) allows to study the trends of social capital and to compare them
across European regions. Although EVS and WVS are two separate surveys, they
are directly comparable.2 Both EVS and WVS are wide compilations of surveys col-
lected in more than 80 countries, representing over 80% of the world’s population.
They provide information on socio-cultural and political change, individual beliefs (on
politics, the economy, religion, etc.), topics related to social and ethnic divisions, per-
sonal finances, familiar and social relationships, happiness and life satisfaction. EVS
data has been collected in four waves between 1981 and 2008, while WVS has been
administered in six waves (1981-84, 1989-93, 1994-99, 1999-2004, 2005-2007 and
2010-2014).
Since this study focuses on trends of social capital across European regions, the
sample covers countries and waves observed approximately in the same period. Dis-
crepancies are systematic: almost every transition country has been surveyed for the
first time in the 1990s, whereas the majority of Western European countries were al-
ready surveyed in the early 1980s. To monitor, describe, and compare the trends on a
homogeneous period, only those countries observed from the wave 1989-1993 onward
are retained for the analysis. The list of countries and waves adopted in the analysis is
available in Table 1. Overall, the paper covers 30 European countries monitored over a
period of over 20 years.
2On the WVS web-site it is possible to download A four waves integrated WVS-EVS data-set is available
on their website together with instructions on how to integrate it with the new waves of EVS and WVS data.
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Table 1: Availability of data across countries and waves
country wave 2 wave 3 wave 4 wave 5 wave 6 first last time span
1989-93 1994-98 1999-04 2005-09 2010-14 year year considered
Western countries:
Austria 1460 – 1522 1510 – 1990 2008 18
Belgium 2792 – 1912 1509 – 1990 2009 19
France 1002 – 1615 2502 – 1990 2008 18
Germany 3437 2026 2036 4139 2046 1990 2013 23
Netherlands 1017 – 1003 2604 1902 1990 2012 22
Switzerland 1400 1212 – 2513 – 1989 2008 19
Mediterranean countries:
Italy 2018 – 2000 2531 – 1990 2009 19
Malta 393 – 1002 1500 – 1991 2008 17
Portugal 1185 – 1000 1553 – 1990 2008 18
Spain 4147 1211 2409 2700 1189 1990 2011 21
Anglosaxon countries:
Great Britain 1484 1093 1000 2602 0 1990 2009 19
Ireland 1000 – 1012 1013 – 1990 2008 18
Scandinavian countries:
Denmark 1030 – 1023 1507 – 1990 2008 18
Finland 588 987 1038 2148 – 1990 2009 19
Iceland 702 – 968 808 – 1990 2009 19
Norway 1239 1127 – 2115 – 1990 2008 18
Sweden 1047 1009 2030 2190 1206 1990 2011 21
Baltic countries:
Estonia 1008 1021 1005 1518 1533 1990 2011 21
Latvia 903 1200 1013 1506 – 1990 2008 18
Lithuania 1000 1009 1018 1500 – 1990 2008 18
Central-Eastern countries:
Czech Rep. 3033 – 1908 1821 – 1991 2008 17
Hungary 999 650 1000 2520 – 1991 2009 18
Poland 1920 1153 1095 2510 966 1989 2012 23
Slovakia 1602 1095 1331 1509 – 1990 2008 18
Slovenia 1035 1007 1006 2403 1069 1992 2011 19
Central-Southern countries:
Bulgaria 1034 1072 1000 2501 – 1990 2008 18
Romania 1103 1239 1146 3265 1503 1993 2012 19
Turkey:
Turkey 1030 1907 4607 3730 1605 1990 2011 21
Former Soviet Union countries:
Belarus 1015 2092 1000 1500 1535 1990 2011 21
Russian Federation 1961 2040 2500 3537 2500 1990 2011 21
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Consistently with the literature referring to the definition and operationalization of
social capital provided by the OECD (Paxton, 1999, Costa and Kahn, 2003, Van Schaik,
2002, Sabatini, 2009), the paper monitors both the relational and the non-relational as-
pects of social capital (for details, see Table 2). The relational social capital is captured
by three components.
Table 2: Summarizing scheme of the different constituents of social capital.
Relational social capital
trust in others
participation in groups and organizations
index of civicness
Non relational social capital
confidence in armed forces
confidence in police
confidence in religious institutions
confidence in democratic institutions
(including: educational system, press, and labor unions)
confidence in public institutions
(including: parliament, social security system, and civil service)
confidence in judicial system
confidence in major companies
1. Trust in others is observed through answers to the question: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful
in dealing with people?”, with answers coded as 1 – most people can be trusted
and 0 – you can’t be too careful (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
2. Participation in groups and associations is measured with a dichotomous vari-
able set to 1 if the respondent participates or performs unpaid voluntary work
for at least one of the listed groups or associations, and 0 otherwise. The list
of groups or associations prompted during the interview contains: social wel-
fare service for elderly; religious organization; education, arts, music or cultural
activities; labour unions; political parties; local political actions; human rights;
conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations;
youth work; sports or recreation; women’s groups; peace movement; organiza-
tions concerned with health; consumer groups; and other groups.
3. The index of civic cooperation is based on answers to questions concerning ac-
ceptability of (1) claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to, (2)
avoiding a fare on public transport, (3) cheating on taxes if you have the chance,
and (4) accepting a bribe. Answers to these questions range on a scale from 1
– never justifiable to 10 – always justifiable. For the purpose of present analy-
sis, each of these variables has been first recoded so that higher values represent
stronger norms of civic cooperation. Subsequently, after verifying that all four
items load on a single factor, the index of civic cooperation is defined as the av-
erage of the four variables. The resulting index of civic cooperation is measured
on a scale from 1 to 10, where higher values represent stronger civicness.
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The non-relational component is measured through several reports of confidence
in institutions. The list of institutions includes (1) religious institutions, (2) armed
forces, (3) police, (4) major companies, (5) judicial system, (6) democratic institutions
(including: education system, press, and labour unions), and (7) public institutions
(including: parliament, social security system, and civil service). Answers range on a
scale from 1 – none at all to 4 – a great deal.
For a proper estimation of the trends, and comparability across countries, missing
data are a major issue. Information on confidence in major companies and the index
of civic cooperation are missing mainly in the fourth and (to a lesser degree) third
waves, when they were not consistently surveyed, which implies that these data are
missing completely at random.3 As such, they are not liable to bias estimates. Given
the subjective nature of such variables, imputation techniques would require strong, if
not arbitrary, assumptions. Therefore, and considering the limited number of variables
affected by the problem, the data is used without imputation. The percentages of miss-
ing data for the remaining variables are typically below 10% thus they do not raise
concerns of seriously biasing the estimates (Schafer, 1997, Allison, 2001, Little and
Rubin, 2002). Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the social capital measures
for the overall sample.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
variable mean sd min max obs missing (%)
participation in groups and organizations 0.441 0.574 0 1 190058 0.6
trust in others 0.297 0.509 0 1 186244 2.6
index of civic cooperation 8.733 1.565 1 10 183606 4.0
confidence in religious institutions 2.573 0.978 1 4 182683 4.4
confidence in armed forces 2.648 0.884 1 4 182057 4.8
confidence in democratic institutions 2.379 0.624 1 4 186484 2.4
confidence in police 2.623 0.851 1 4 185278 3.1
confidence in public institutions 2.353 0.683 1 4 185222 3.2
confidence in major companies 2.305 0.797 1 4 156795 18.0
confidence in judicial system 2.475 0.852 1 4 176651 7.6
To estimate the country-specific trends, the proxies of social capital are regressed
on a time variable, which contains the years 1990-2012 (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007, Sar-
racino, 2012). The regression technique reflects the nature of the dependent variable.
For dichotomous variables a probit model with robust standard errors is used, for which
the marginal effects at the mean are reported. Hence, for trust in others and participa-
tion in groups and organizations the model presented in equation 1 is used, where the
individual-level indicators of social capital, zi, are regressed on time (subscript i refers
to individuals). This model is estimated for each country separately.
3For a more detailed discussion on pattern of missingness and their implication for econometric analysis,
please refer to Schafer (1997, 1999), Allison (2001).
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SCi =
{
1 if zi > 0,
0 if zi ≤ 0,
(1)
zi = β TIMEi+ εi, where εi ∼ N(0,1)
For discrete ordered dependent variables, ordered probit or logit models should be
applied (Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005). However, in such cases OLS estimation gives equiv-
alent results in terms of the sign and of the significance of the coefficients (Ferrer-i Car-
bonell and Frijters, 2004, Blanchflower, 2008). Moreover, OLSmodels have the advan-
tage of allowing a direct comparison between results of various estimations. Therefore,
for the non-relational measures of social capital, and for the index of civic cooperation
(which is measured on a continuous scale), the model presented in equation 2 is used.
Also in these cases, models are estimated for individual data (subscript i refers to indi-
viduals), and separate regressions are run for each country.
SCi = α +β TIMEi+ εi (2)
The coefficient of the TIME variable in OLS models (equation 2), and the marginal
effects in probit models (equation 1) represent the average yearly change of social
capital in a given country over the observed period. These values are considered as
measures of the country-specific trends of social capital.
The hypothesis on convergence of social capital among European regions is tested
with the model described in equation 3.
SCi = α +β1TIMEi+β2REGIONi+β3REGIONi ·TIMEi+ εi (3)
where REGION is a dummy variable indicating Southern countries for the South –
North-West convergence, and Eastern countries for the East – North-West convergence.
Equation 3 is estimated with a probit model in case of dichotomous dependent vari-
ables, and an OLS in case of other variables. The analysis is run on the pooled sample
of countries. The sign of the coefficient β3 informs about convergence: a positive sign
indicates that compared to the trend in North-Western countries, the trend in the region
of interest was more positive. This may indicate closing the gap in case of an initial
negative gap, but also widening of the gap if the initial gap was positive. To facilitate
the interpretation of the results, for each proxy of social capital the predicted gap in
1990 and 2012 are reported.
A set of bivariate correlations of the initial level of social capital and the trends of
social capital for each proxy used in the analysis informs about the path dependency in
the trends of social capital. This analysis is performed at country level.
4 Results
This section first illustrates the cross-country and cross-regional variation of trends of
social capital. Subsequently, it reports the results on the convergence of social capital
among European regions. The section concludes by describing the results of path-
dependency of the trends of social capital. Tables 8 and 9 (in the Appendix) report the
coefficients of the TIME variable for each proxy of social capital in each country.
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4.1 Trends of social capital across Europe
Figure 1 summarizes for each country the trends of the three measures of relational
social capital: participation in groups and associations, trust in others, and civic coop-
eration.
The trends of participation in groups and associations are mixed. Participation is
slightly increasing in Western Europe, and particularly in Switzerland, Ireland, Den-
mark, France, Belgium, and Italy. Slovenia seems to be the only transition country
with a positive trend of participation in groups and associations. In other countries the
trends of membership and voluntary activities are negative or non significantly differ-
ent from zero. The strongest decline of the trends happened in Baltic, Central Eastern
and post-soviet countries.
A mixed pattern arises also for the index of civic cooperation. The trend is most
positive in Hungary, Finland, Portugal, Belgium and, to a smaller extent, in otherWest-
ern and Scandinavian countries. On average trends are more positive in the Western
part of Europe than in the Eastern one, but the regional division is not clear-cut.
Trust in others grows most in Denmark, and Belarus. Generally, trust in oth-
ers increases in Scandinavian, Baltic, and Western countries, and it decreases in all
Mediterranean and Anglosaxon countries, as well as in many post-communist coun-
tries (Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Russian Federation). The strongest decline in
trust in others takes place in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, and Spain.
The trends of non-relational social capital are summarized in Figures 2 and 3.
Non-relational social capital grows in the Baltic countries, whereas the Central-Eastern
countries (with the exception of Slovenia and Slovakia) mainly experience a decline.
As documented in previous studies (Sarracino, 2012), the trends of confidence in
religious institutions are mixed. The strongest increase takes place in Bulgaria, Ro-
mania, Turkey, Belarus, and Denmark, whereas the strongest declines occur in the
traditionally Catholic countries: Ireland, Spain, and Poland. However, even though the
trends of confidence in religious institutions are both positive and negative, the posi-
tive trends are overall weak, whereas the negative ones have larger magnitudes. The
only exception are the Central-Southern countries and Turkey, where the confidence in
religious institutions increases considerably.
A similar pattern emerges for the confidence in major companieswhich declines in
sixteen countries, exhibits flat trends in Norway, and Portugal, and increases in twelve
countries. The drop of confidence in major companies affects mainly the residents
of the Western part of Europe. Here the trends are predominantly negative, and some
increase occurs only in Switzerland and Denmark. In the post-communist countries the
trends are predominantly positive, and negative only in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
The confidence in democratic institutions grows mainly in the Western, Mediter-
ranean, Anglosaxon, and Scandinavian countries, whereas the major negative varia-
tions pertain to Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Hungary, and the Russian Federation.
Confidence in public institutions follows a similar path: it increases in the major-
ity of Western European countries with the exception of Anglosaxon ones. The most
notable exceptions among this set of countries are Austria, Germany, the Netherlands,
and Iceland. In contrast to that, some of the Central-Eastern and Central-Southern
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Note: The graph shows the average yearly change over the observed period.
Non-significant trends are denoted by shaded shapes. Trust in others and participation
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Figure 1: The trends of the three proxies of relational social capital for each country:
trust in others, participation in groups and associations, and the index of civic cooper-
ation.
12
−.02 0 .02 .04
postsoviet
Turkey
centre_south
centre_east
baltic
scandinavian
anglosaxon
mediterranean
western
Russia
Belarus
Turkey
Romania
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Slovakia
Poland
Hungary
Czech Rep.
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Sweden
Norway
Iceland
Finland
Denmark
Great Britain
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
Malta
Italy
Switzerland
Netherlands
Germany
France
Belgium
Austria
confidence: rel. institutions confidence: armed forces
confidence: the police confidence: major companies
Note: The graph shows the average yearly change over the observed period.
Non-significant trends are denoted by shaded shapes. Confidence in institutions takes
the values between 1 and 4.
Figure 2: The trends of the four proxies of confidence in institutions for each country:
armed forces, religious institutions, police, and major companies.
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Figure 3: The trends of the three proxies of confidence in institutions for each country:
public institutions, democratic institutions, and judicial system.
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countries showed the most negative trends. All over Europe, Poland experiences the
strongest decrease of confidence in public institutions, followed by Bulgaria.
The confidence in judicial system increases in Scandinavian andWestern countries,
whereas it declines in Central-Eastern, Central-Southern countries as well as in Russia
and Lithuania.
Only two indicators of confidence in institutions show clear, positive trends be-
tween 1990 and 2012: the armed forces and the police. Confidence in armed forces
increases in Western and Baltic countries. Specifically, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
experience the strongest increase in Europe, followed by Malta, and Italy. Norway, and
Switzerland are exceptional among Western countries in their negative trends. Finally,
confidence in armed forces declines in many transition countries, with the strongest
trend in Bulgaria.
Trends of confidence in police follow an even more positive pattern, as they in-
crease almost everywhere in Europe. Again, the strongest increase occurs in Baltic
countries. The exception to this picture are the Anglosaxon countries, the Netherlands,
and Bulgaria where the confidence in police declined strongly.
4.2 Differences in the trends of social capital across European re-
gions
The differences in the trends of various dimensions of social capital among European
regions are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
The boxplots reveal that almost in every case the trends differ both across and
within regions. A clear East-West divide is noticeable for group membership. The
Western, Mediterranean, Anglosaxon, and Scandinavian countries experience weakly
positive trends, whereas the Eastern part of Europe is characterized by negative trends
(see Figure 4). Membership declines most strongly in Baltic, Centre-Eastern and post-
soviet countries.
Trust in others increases in Western, Scandinavian, Baltic, and post-soviet coun-
tries. The growth experienced by Denmark is much stronger than in other European
countries. In the Mediterranean and Anglosaxon countries the changes are rather ho-
mogeneous and negative. Similarly negative trends are observed in Central-Southern
Europe and, to some extent, also in Central-Eastern Europe.
The trends of the index of civic cooperation are on average positive in Western,
Central-Eastern and Central-Southern countries. Post-soviet, Baltic and Anglosaxon
countries are characterized by negative trends.
The remaining three graphs in Figure 4 present the trends of confidence in religious
institutions, in armed forces, and in police. As pointed out previously, the trends of
confidence in religious institutions are predominantly negative across Europe. They are
homogeneously positive only in Central-Southern countries, Turkey, and post-soviet
countries.
Also the charts on the confidence in armed forces and police are substantially in
line with the positive trends illustrated in the previous section. Confidence in armed
forces again divides Europe into East and West: Western, Mediterranean, Anglosaxon,
and Scandinavian countries, along with the Baltic ones, report predominantly positive
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Note: The boxplots show the median as well as the upper and lower quartile of the
trends in each region.
Figure 4: Distribution of the trends (i.e. the average yearly change over the observed
period) of social capital by regions in Europe.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the trends (i.e. the average yearly change over the observed
period) of social capital by regions in Europe.
trends. In this group, Mediterranean and Baltic countries experience a stronger growth
than others. Countries of Eastern Europe experience almost flat trends, in many cases
not-significantly different from zero. Only in Central-Southern countries and Turkey
the confidence in armed forces clearly decreases.
Confidence in police increases almost everywhere in Europe. The only clear ex-
ception are Anglosaxon countries where the confidence declines, and – to a smaller
extent – Central-Southern countries. The confidence increases most in the Baltic and
Mediterranean countries, as well as in Post-Soviet countries and in Turkey.
The West-East divide appears clearly in the case of confidence in major companies
(see Figure 5). The Western, Mediterranean, Anglosaxon, and Scandinavian countries
report decreasing trends of confidence, whereas Eastern countries report flat trends.
Confidence in major companies increases only in Baltic countries and to a smaller
extent in post-soviet countries. In contrast, Central-Southern countries are character-
ized by high within group variability which makes them more similar to their Western
counterparts.
The trends of confidence in judicial system do not show remarkable differences
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across regions. The trends are overall close to zero, and only some of the post-soviet
and Baltic countries experience a strong increase. However, both post-soviet and Baltic
countries are characterized by considerable internal differences, as illustrated by the
large size of the boxes. The Central-Eastern and Central-Southern countries are the
ones in which confidence in judicial system uniformly decreases.
A similar picture appears for confidence in democratic and public institutions. Also
in these cases the trends are modest and close to zero in almost all regions. The
trends within regions are relatively homogeneous, except for post-soviet countries and
Mediterranean ones (in case of confidence in democratic institutions). Similarly to the
case of confidence in judicial system, also the confidence in democratic institutions
declines more in Central-Eastern and Central-Southern countries. Also confidence
in public institutions declines more strongly in Central-Eastern and Central-Southern
countries and, to a smaller extent, in Baltic ones. The trends of confidence in public in-
stitutions are positive and relatively homogeneous in Mediterranean and Scandinavian
countries; they are negative in Anglosaxon countries.
4.3 Rankings
To summarize the differences among the trends of the proxies of social capital, Table 4
reports the rankings of countries with the most positive and the most negative trends.
Some of the patterns highlighted in previous sections are visible. For example,
the trends of group membership are predominantly negative (20 out of 30 countries).
Moreover, the 3 countries with the most positive trends are all Western, and the coun-
tries with the most negative trends are all post-communist. The trends of trust in others
are more positive, with 13 countries experiencing growth, and 10 – decline. Denmark
is among the three countries with the most positive trends (together with Switzerland
and Belarus), whereas Slovakia, Ireland, and Bulgaria appear among the countries with
the most negative trends. The trends of the index of civic cooperation follow a simi-
lar pattern: 15 countries experience growth and other 10 experience decline. Also in
this case the list of the countries with the worst trends is made mainly of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. A quick look at the last column of Table 4 confirms that this is a
quite general feature of the trends of social capital in Europe. Only in few cases among
countries with the most negative trends appear Anglosaxon countries (confidence in
police, in religious institutions, and trust in others), Germany and Malta (confidence
in major companies), Spain (confidence in religious institutions). This suggests that
the East-West gap in endowments of social capital (Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008) is
accompanied by a gap in trends: Eastern countries not only have lower levels of social
capital, but also declining trends.
For what concerns non-relational social capital, Table 4 confirms the prevalence of
positive trends of confidence in armed forces and in police (growth in 18 and 20 coun-
tries out of 30, respectively), the mixed trends of confidence in religious, democratic,
and public institutions, and in judicial system, while for confidence in major compa-
nies negative trends prevail (16 countries). Moreover, Baltic countries stand out with
the fastest growth rate of the confidence in major companies, police, and armed forces
in Europe.
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Table 4: Number of positive, negative and non significant trends along with a list of
the three countries with the most positive and most negative trends by proxy of social
capital.
variable N of countries N of countries N of countries 3 countries 3 countries
with positive with negative with with most with most
trends trends non-significant positive negative
trends trends trends
participation in 8 20 2 Switzerland Slovakia
groups and associations Ireland Latvia
France Russia
trust in others 13 10 7 Denmark Bulgaria
Belarus Slovakia
Switzerland Ireland
index of civic 15 10 5 Hungary Belarus
cooperation Finland Czech Rep.
Portugal Lithuania
confidence in 12 15 3 Bulgaria Poland
religious institutions Turkey Spain
Romania Ireland
confidence in 20 9 1 Latvia Hungary
armed forces Malta Romania
Lithuania Bulgaria
confidence in 15 12 3 Switzerland Hungary
democratic institutions Portugal Bulgaria
Belarus Romania
confidence in 18 4 8 Estonia Bulgaria
police Latvia Great Britain
Belarus Ireland
confidence in 16 14 0 Switzerland Germany
public institutions Belarus Poland
Spain Bulgaria
confidence in 12 16 2 Latvia Germany
major companies Estonia Poland
Belarus Malta
confidence in 12 12 6 Turkey Bulgaria
judicial system Belarus Hungary
Switzerland Romania
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4.4 Convergence among regions
This section tests the hypothesis of convergence of social capital among European re-
gions. This amounts to check whether the social capital gap among regions in 2012
reduced compared to the gap in 1990. The results of the model presented in equation 3
are summarized in Table 5 for Eastern countries, and in Table 6 for Southern countries.
In both cases the tables report the coefficient of the interaction term between regions
and trends, its significance and the predicted gaps in 1990 and 2012.
Table 5: Convergence of social capital between Eastern and North-Western countries.
variable interaction term gap 1990 gap 2012
participation in groups and associations -0.034∗ 0.15 -0.09
trust in others -0.008∗ -0.12 -0.18
index of civic cooperation -0.002 -0.21 -0.25
confidence in religious institutions -0.000 -0.11 -0.11
confidence in armed forces -0.008∗ 0.17 0.00
confidence in democratic institutions -0.009∗ 0.07 -0.12
confidence in the police 0.006∗ -0.45 -0.31
confidence in public institutions -0.012∗ -0.19 -0.45
confidence in major companies 0.010∗ -0.08 0.15
confidence in judicial system -0.015∗ -0.27 -0.59
∗ p < 0.10
The trends for Eastern countries are significantly different from those of North-
Western countries in 8 out of 10 variables. However, only in case of confidence in
police and in major companies this meant closing the gap, i.e. the initially disadvan-
taged East cought up with the West of Europe. By 2012 people in Eastern Europe
trusted major companies more than in North-Western countries, which means that the
gap reversed. On the contrary, the gap widened in case of trust in others, confidence
in public institutions, and judicial system. In 1990 Eastern countries had, on average,
higher participation in groups and associations, and more confidence in democratic
institutions and in armed forces. In 2012 the latter converged to the levels of North-
Western European countries (the gap in 2012 is zero), while the former two variables
reduced and the gap turned negative.
The trends of social capital in Southern countries are not significantly different
from those of North-Western countries in case of participation in groups and associa-
tions, and civic cooperation. Hence the gap remained the same (see Table 6). The gap
widened in the case of trust in others, and of confidence in religious institutions, demo-
cratic institutions, and major companies. In these cases, the initial gap was favorable to
Southern countries, but 22 years later this asset was entirely wasted. The gap narrowed
in case of confidence in police and in public institutions: in both cases the differences
between regions reduced and Southern countries caught-up with North-Western ones.
The trends of confidence in judicial system between North-Western and Southern coun-
tries diverged: the initial gap widened over the considered period. Armed forces is the
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Table 6: Convergence of social capital between Southern and North-Western countries.
variable interaction term gap 1990 gap 2012
participation in groups and associations 0.002 -0.22 -0.20
trust in others -0.016∗ 0.04 -0.09
index of civic cooperation 0.000 -0.03 -0.03
confidence in religious institutions -0.008∗ 0.05 -0.12
confidence in armed forces 0.007∗ 0.03 0.17
confidence in democratic institutions -0.007∗ 0.01 -0.14
confidence in the police 0.012∗ -0.40 -0.14
confidence in public institutions 0.007∗ -0.18 -0.02
confidence in major companies -0.004∗ 0.05 -0.04
confidence in justice system -0.004∗ -0.29 -0.37
∗ p < 0.10
only institution whose confidence was higher in Southern countries in 1990 and for
which the gap further increased in 2012.
Summing up, these figures do not show any consistent convergence among regions
in Europe. While in some cases the gap narrowed, in other cases the differences in-
creased or remained unchanged.
4.5 Path-dependency
The hypothesis of path dependency states that the past stocks of social capital may
affect its future trends. To investigate this issue, the trends of each proxy of social
capital are correlated with their initial levels. The results are reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Correlations between trends and initial endowments of social capital.
variables coefficient p-values
participation in groups and organizations 0.35 0.053
trust in others 0.33 0.068
index of civic cooperation −0.47 0.007
confidence in religious institutions −0.24 0.208
confidence in armed forces −0.71 0.000
confidence in police −0.55 0.001
confidence in major companies −0.80 0.000
confidence in judicial system 0.05 0.757
confidence in democratic institutions −0.19 0.315
confidence in public institutions −0.34 0.070
In 3 out of 10 proxies of social capital the correlation is not significant at 10%
level. These are: confidence in religious institutions, in democratic institutions, and in
the judicial system. In case of group membership and of trust in others the correlation
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is positive and significant at 10%; in case of the index of civic cooperation and of
confidence in armed forces, police, and major companies the negative correlations are
significant at 1%. This leads to conclude that the index of civic cooperation, and several
aspects of confidence in institutions grow more in countries where they are initially
lower, whereas group membership and trust in others grow more in countries where
the initial levels are high. These results suggest that the development of relational
social capital depends on its existing stocks, while this does not hold for confidence in
institutions.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this analysis was to extend the existing evidence on the trends of social
capital in Europe by investigating the changes that took place in 30 countries from
1990 to 2012. It accounted for 10 measures of social capital, including both relational
social capital (trust in others, participation in groups and associations, and index of
civic cooperation) and non-relational social capital (confidence in institutions).
The results show a mixed picture, with some proxies of social capital increasing in
some countries and regions, and decreasing in others. The negative trends prevail most
for participation in groups and associations, and for confidence in religious institutions
and in major companies. The increase of social capital was strongest in terms of confi-
dence in police and in armed forces; also the confidence in public institutions and trust
in others increased in at least half of the countries. For other proxies of social capital
the results were mixed.
This analysis adds to previous works showing that Robert Putnam’s thesis on the
erosion of social capital cannot be directly generalized to other countries. In Europe
the trends were both positive and negative for various proxies and various countries.
Moreover, the proxies of social capital that decreased the most do not necessarily sig-
nify erosion of civic society. The trends of participation in groups and associations
consistently decreased in many post-communist countries, but this change was the ef-
fect of systemic transformation. Considering that such organizations in communist
regimes were often bureaucratic institutions controlled by the state leads to conclusion
that counting them among the sources of social capital was a mistake resulting from
applying Western definitions to Eastern reality. Similarly, the decline of confidence in
major companies does not necessarily indicate the erosion of civic society, but rather
may be interpreted as a growth of awareness that potentially builds a platform for fur-
ther civic movements.
Moreover, the results show some signs of convergence of social capital among Eu-
ropean regions. Confidence in police in both Southern and Eastern regions converged
with North-Western Europe. Trends converged also for confidence in major compa-
nies (in Eastern Europe) and for confidence in public institutions (in Southern Europe).
However, other proxies of social capital show no signs of convergence. For some of
these proxies the gap widened. This happened for confidence in the judicial system and
democratic institutions (in both East and South of Europe), and confidence in public
institutions and trust in others (in Eastern Europe). This is alarming because the period
of European unification was related to enlarging of the gap of confidence in judicial
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and public institutions, rather than to closing it.
The results for path-dependency are mixed. On one hand, relational social capital –
including participation in groups and associations and trust in others – increased more
in countries where its initial level was higher. For non relational social capital and the
index of civic cooperation the result was opposite: higher initial values correlated with
negative trends. The countries where the initial level of social capital was the lowest
were also the countries which experienced the strongest growth of confidence in armed
forces, police, and major companies. The process may be related to the European
integration, since Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were often among the countries with
the lowest initial levels and the strongest increase. However, this conclusion cannot be
generalized to other countries, in particular to the Central-Eastern and Central-Southern
ones, which often experienced a considerable decline of social capital.
Overall, this evidence suggests that the dynamics related to the two forms of social
capital – relational and non relational – are different. The growth of relational social
capital seems to depend on the existing stocks of this form of social capital. The index
of civic cooperation is an exception to this rule. This is probably because functioning
of and confidence in institutions affect social cooperation thus making this proxy more
similar to non relational social capital. In the latter case, growth seems to be strongest
when it originates from low initial levels.
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A Trends by country
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Table 8: Trends (average change per 10 years) of relational social capital by country.
Country participation in trust in others index of
groups and civic
associations cooperation
AUSTRIA -0.07∗ 0.03∗ -0.35∗
BELGIUM 0.06∗ 0.01 0.27∗
BULGARIA -0.12∗ -0.07∗ 0.09∗
BELARUS -0.12∗ 0.09∗ -0.07∗
CZECH REPUBLIC -0.17∗ 0.02∗ 0.21∗
DENMARK 0.07∗ 0.10∗ 0.06∗
ESTONIA -0.09∗ 0.07∗ -0.02
FINLAND -0.04∗ 0.04∗ 0.40∗
FRANCE 0.07∗ 0.01 0.08∗
GERMANY -0.03∗ 0.05∗ 0.14∗
HUNGARY -0.16∗ 0.01 0.54∗
ICELAND 0.00 0.04∗ 0.14∗
IRELAND 0.08∗ -0.05∗ -0.19∗
ITALY 0.06∗ -0.01∗ 0.07∗
LATVIA -0.24∗ 0.03∗ -0.20∗
LITHUANIA -0.17∗ 0.00 -0.38∗
MALTA -0.14∗ 0.00 -0.09∗
NETHERLANDS -0.04∗ 0.06∗ 0.23∗
NORWAY 0.00 0.06∗ -0.06∗
POLAND -0.17∗ -0.04∗ -0.15∗
PORTUGAL -0.08∗ -0.01 0.34∗
ROMANIA -0.03∗ -0.02∗ 0.01
RUSSIAN FEDERATION -0.22∗ -0.01∗ -0.33∗
SLOVAKIA (Slovak Republic) -0.26∗ -0.06∗ 0.28∗
SLOVENIA 0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.17∗
SPAIN 0.03∗ -0.05∗ 0.01
SWEDEN -0.05∗ 0.01 -0.18∗
SWITZERLAND 0.11∗ -0.02∗ 0.07∗
TURKEY -0.04∗ 0.01∗ 0.00
UNITED KINGDOM -0.03∗ -0.02∗ 0.03
Note: ∗ p < 0.10.
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Table 9: List of the trends (coefficients and their significance) of non relational social
capital by country.
Country Confidence in...
religious armed democratic police public major judicial
instit. forces instit. instit. companies system
AUSTRIA -0.17 ∗ 0.12 ∗ 0.03 ∗ -0.00 -0.07 ∗ -0.14 ∗ 0.04 ∗
BELGIUM -0.13 ∗ 0.18 ∗ 0.05 ∗ 0.15 ∗ 0.08 ∗ -0.03 ∗ 0.02
BULGARIA 0.17 ∗ -0.27 ∗ -0.17 ∗ -0.14 ∗ -0.29 ∗ -0.17 ∗ -0.31 ∗
BELARUS 0.10 ∗ 0.04 ∗ 0.13 ∗ 0.28 ∗ 0.24 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.18 ∗
CZECH REPUBLIC -0.17 ∗ -0.09 ∗ -0.04 ∗ 0.01 -0.17 ∗ 0.07 ∗ -0.16 ∗
DENMARK 0.12 ∗ 0.21 ∗ 0.06 ∗ -0.01 0.11 ∗ 0.13 ∗ 0.07 ∗
ESTONIA 0.01 0.42 ∗ 0.02 ∗ 0.45 ∗ 0.04 ∗ 0.24 ∗ 0.18 ∗
FINLAND 0.05 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.22 ∗ 0.08 ∗ -0.17 ∗ 0.11 ∗
FRANCE -0.06 ∗ 0.17 ∗ 0.03 ∗ 0.09 ∗ 0.02 ∗ -0.17 ∗ -0.03 ∗
GERMANY -0.02 ∗ 0.22 ∗ 0.02 ∗ 0.13 ∗ -0.06 ∗ -0.13 ∗ 0.05 ∗
HUNGARY -0.11 ∗ -0.16 ∗ -0.13 ∗ -0.03 -0.16 ∗ -0.05 ∗ -0.14 ∗
ICELAND -0.06 ∗ 0.23 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.14 ∗ -0.05 ∗ -0.09 ∗ 0.01
IRELAND -0.27 ∗ 0.07 ∗ 0.04 ∗ -0.20 ∗ -0.04 ∗ -0.07 ∗ -0.04 ∗
ITALY 0.04 ∗ 0.28 ∗ -0.03 ∗ 0.10 ∗ 0.09 ∗ -0.18 ∗ 0.09 ∗
LATVIA -0.01 0.44 ∗ 0.10 ∗ 0.32 ∗ 0.09 ∗ 0.30 ∗ 0.05 ∗
LITHUANIA 0.05 ∗ 0.41 ∗ 0.02 ∗ 0.14 ∗ -0.13 ∗ 0.07 ∗ -0.11 ∗
MALTA -0.13 ∗ 0.39 ∗ 0.02 0.31 ∗ 0.08 ∗ -0.23 ∗ 0.00
NETHERLANDS -0.05 ∗ 0.19 ∗ -0.09 ∗ -0.04 ∗ -0.14 ∗ -0.03 ∗ 0.01
NORWAY -0.03 ∗ -0.07 ∗ -0.03 ∗ -0.00 0.07 ∗ -0.02 0.08 ∗
POLAND -0.24 ∗ -0.05 ∗ -0.13 ∗ 0.16 ∗ -0.33 ∗ -0.25 ∗ -0.12 ∗
PORTUGAL 0.04 0.23 ∗ 0.13 ∗ 0.28 ∗ 0.03 ∗ -0.00 0.00
ROMANIA 0.05 ∗ -0.16 ∗ -0.15 ∗ 0.03 ∗ -0.05 ∗ 0.07 ∗ -0.17 ∗
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0.03 ∗ -0.06 ∗ -0.11 ∗ -0.01 -0.03 ∗ 0.03 ∗ -0.06 ∗
SLOVAKIA (Slovak Republic) 0.05 ∗ 0.15 ∗ 0.02 0.14 ∗ 0.12 ∗ 0.05 ∗ -0.13 ∗
SLOVENIA -0.06 ∗ 0.04 ∗ -0.08 ∗ -0.01 -0.13 ∗ 0.04 ∗ -0.14 ∗
SPAIN -0.25 ∗ 0.13 ∗ -0.12 ∗ 0.15 ∗ 0.07 ∗ -0.12 ∗ -0.03 ∗
SWEDEN 0.04 ∗ -0.01 -0.02 ∗ 0.00 0.08 ∗ -0.08 ∗ 0.14 ∗
SWITZERLAND 0.07 ∗ -0.02 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.18 ∗ 0.30 ∗ 0.04 ∗ 0.15 ∗
TURKEY 0.15 ∗ -0.11 ∗ -0.00 0.16 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.01 ∗ 0.10 ∗
UNITED KINGDOM -0.07 ∗ 0.08 ∗ 0.03 ∗ -0.07 ∗ -0.06 ∗ -0.10 ∗ -0.02
Note: ∗ p < 0.10.
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